We have just released a new set of features in cmplid:// designed to assist users with better understanding the control application logic their cyber security programs implement. One of those features is the visualization of the logic network configured within cmplid://. This image shows a very high-level view of the Attributes and their values relevant to a nuclear cyber security program implementing NEI 08-09 or NRC RG 5.71. This type of visualization can be extremely helpful throughout the plant modification process,
10 CFR 73.54
Richard Dahl, founder and ceo of cmplid:// will be speaking at the ICS JWG Spring Meeting in Minneapolis April 11th – 13th. Stop by our booth and say hello if you’re attending.
Vulnerability Management is a difficult function in general, however, for Operational Technology environments, e.g., industrial control systems,
SCADA systems, IoT or other non-traditional technology managers, it is extremely problematic.
Generally, vulnerabilities can be classified as either those resulting from source-code errors or configuration issues within a software package.
Richard Dahl, cmplid://’s CEO will be speaking at the ICS JWG Fall Conference September 13-15 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL.
A Simplified Approach to Implementing the NIST CSF within Operational Technologies
The NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure provides guidance for many industries for securing Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) systems supporting critical functions and processes. Use of the framework provides system owners with a view of deployed security postures and technical outcomes desired that can be used to manage cyber security risks.
At the NITSL conference last week in Charlotte I had a great discussion with some really smart people from a US Nuclear Licensee. They were all former colleagues of mine from my past life as a consultant. One of them asked the group of us what we would do to improve or replace NEI 08-09 in order to make the cyber security program for nuclear power plants sustainable.
I love the challenge of the question but feel that in order to answer it,
cmplid:// will be at NITSL in Charlotte July 18-21. Come check us out Wednesday night for your chance to win a Bowers & Wilkins T7 bluetooth speaker. Sounds Amazing! We will of course, be providing live demos of the best security management automation solution known to man.
My last few blog posts (here, here and here) have been critical of the state of the Cyber Security Program being implemented at US nuclear plants. I realize that, it was my intention. There are opportunities for improvement as I have said. I believe that the Nuclear Cyber Security issues I have critiqued are due to the inexperience and steep learning curve faced by the NRC and the nuclear power industry at the beginning of this initiative and I am sure that “if they had known then…”
Mistakes happen to all humans in all endeavors. The purpose of this post is NOT to criticize or shame anyone, but rather to point out some opportunities for improving NEI 08-09 Rev 7. The current version of that document (the basis for the Cyber Security Plans at nuclear licensees in the US) has a number of issues. I spoke about the overall issues here and in my previous post I spoke about specific controls included that provide no value.
In my previous post I expressed my opinion that the Nuclear Cyber Security Plans at US licensees have some deficiencies. In this post I want to talk about a couple of examples of the unnecessary controls within RG 5.71 and NEI 08-09. These controls, and perhaps others, should be removed from the next revision of NEI 08-09, as it should be obvious they are not necessary to protect SSEP functionality at any nuclear plant.
D 2.10 Non-Repudiation: This technical cyber security control ensures the protection of CDAs and audit records against an individual falsely denying they performed a particular action.
You cannot implement a cyber security program that you don’t understand.
This is the fundamental problem that cmplid:// was designed to solve. Every cyber security program is complex and therefore there is no “easy button,” as much as we’d like to think there is. Planning for the implementation of a cyber security program includes more than developing a timetable, scheduling resources and tasks, and acquiring technology. The planning must include analysis of the requirements mandated by the program.